Maryland's "Grand Bargain" Prevails: Non-Dependent Children Barred from Suing Employers
In a recent decision, the Supreme Court of Maryland was asked to examine the longstanding exclusivity provision of the Maryland Workers' Compensation Act (“Act”).
On July 1, 2025, the Supreme Court of Maryland, in a narrow 4-3 decision, held that an employer that complies with the requirements of the Act, enjoys immunity from civil suit, including in a wrongful death action brought by a non-dependent adult child.
In February 2021, John Ledford sustained fatal injuries while working for Jenway Contracting, Inc. (“Jenway”). Mr. Ledford was survived by his adult, non-dependent daughter, Summer Ledford (“Ledford”), who was not eligible for death benefits under the Act. She instead filed a wrongful death suit against Jenway in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. Jenway moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that the exclusivity of the Act limited its liability and immunized it from the wrongful death claim. The Circuit Court for Baltimore County agreed, dismissing the complaint, and the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed.
The Supreme Court of Maryland issued a writ of certiorari to address the following questions: (1) Does LE §9-509’s exclusivity provision bar a deceased covered employee’s non-dependent, adult child from pursuing claims against the deceased covered employee’s employer; and (2) If so, does LE §9-509 conflict with Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights?
Md. Code, Lab. & Empl. §9-509 provides, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this title, the liability of an employer under this title is exclusive” and that “the compensation provided under this title to a covered employee or the dependents of a covered employee is in place of any right of action against any person.”
There are two narrow exceptions to the exclusivity provision where an action for damages may be brought: (1) if an employer fails to secure workers’ compensation coverage or (2) if a covered employee is injured or killed as the result of the deliberate intent of the employer.
Ledford asserted that she was not limited by the Act’s exclusivity provision, arguing that the language of LE §9-509(b) applies to a covered employee or the dependents of a covered employee, not non-dependent children of covered employees, such as herself. She argued that the Act was passed in 1914 and that the Wrongful Death Act was revised in 1997 to allow non-dependent adult children a cause of action. Ledford further maintained that while LE §9-684 limits liability to non-dependents for reimbursement, she could still seek compensation under the theory that reimbursement is not compensation. Lastly, she argued a violation of Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights on the basis that Jenway’s interpretation of LE §9-509 denied an entire class of persons access to the courts and left them remediless.
Conversely, Jenway argued that the exclusivity provision limits an employer’s liability if they are compliant with the requirements of the Act, and provides two exceptions to exclusivity, neither of which applied to the case at hand. Jenway further argued that the General Assembly contemplated situations where there are no dependents in enacting LE §9-684, which limits liability to medical bills, funeral benefits, and assessments, and that subjecting employers to suit would “undo the quid pro quo that the Grand Bargain was intended to effectuate.” Jenway contended there was no violation of Article 19 because the exclusivity provision does not “abrogate or modify a traditional remedy” and the Act “created a new process for obtaining a remedy that is a reasonable restriction on access to the courts and benefits significantly more Marylanders than it harms.”
The Maryland Supreme Court went through the history of the Act and the societal problems the legislature sought to alleviate by enacting it in 1914. The Act aimed to provide injured employees a quick and efficient way to receive medical treatment and compensation through a “no-fault,” uniform system, and sought to prevent double recovery. In exchange for the costly burden of carrying workers’ compensation insurance, employers are afforded immunity from suit through the exclusivity provision. This legislative quid pro quo is colloquially referred to as the “Grand Bargain,” and is foundational to the Act.
In finding that the Act’s exclusivity provision forecloses a wrongful death suit by a non-dependent child of a deceased covered employee, the Court reasoned that “the plain language of L&E 9-509 is unambiguous in that a compliant employer’s liability for a covered employee’s work related injuries or death extends no further than what is provided in the Act itself” and “[b]ecause the Act does not authorize adult non-dependent children of a covered employee to file a wrongful death action for a work-related death of a parent, employers are not subject to such liability.”
In rejecting Ledford’s argument that the exclusivity provision barring her wrongful death action would be in violation of Article 19, the Court explained that she is not left remediless, as there is a statutory allowance for non-dependents with regard to funeral and medical expenses under LE §9-684 and §9-689(c). The Court observed, “[i]f the General Assembly had intended the 1997 revision to the WDA to authorize claims by non-dependent children against the employers of their deceased parents, it could have reciprocally revised the Act’s exclusivity provision to so provide. It did not.” Moreover, the Court concluded that it would be unreasonable to subject compliant employers to suit by non-dependents, stating that “[i]t would render their immunity effectively meaningless when there are non-dependent children involved, which, in addition to being unreasonable, flies in the face of our basic statutory interpretation principles and would undermine the fundamental framework of the Act.”
This decision is a significant victory for employers and insurers, as it reaffirms the exclusivity provision and immunity principles the Act was carefully built. Nevertheless, as the Court pointed out, changes to the Act could still be made by the General Assembly, but for now, the Grand Bargain remains intact.
Katherine Nalley